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1. INTRODUCTION
The principle of subsidiarity, as it is defined in Article 5(3) TEU, allows the 
Union to act
‘only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, 
but can rather, by reasons of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved at Union level’.
This definition has remained substantially similar since Maastricht, when the 
Member States introduced subsidiarity to the written text of the Treaties in the 
second indent of Article 3b EC.1 The principle of subsidiarity was elaborated in 
more detail at the 1992 European Council in Edinburgh, thus became legally 
binding and subject to judicial review. In general terms, the principle of sub-
sidiarity is often summarized as the idea that decisions should be taken ‘at the 
level closest to those who are affected’, or as a ‘space’ in which the diversity of 
* Samuli Miettinen is Associate Professor of Transnational Law at Tallinn University and Uni-
versity Lecturer with Title of Docent at Helsinki University. Joonas Tervo, BA (Law, TLU) 
is an LLM candidate at the University of Eastern Finland and research assistant for Samuli 
Miettinen. We are grateful to the editors, anonymous reviewer, and the participants of the 
‘The Principle of Subsidiarity – What Next?’ workshop held at Uppsala University on 7 April 
2016 for constructive comments on earlier drafts.
1 Estella, Antonio, The EU Principle of Subsidiarity and Its Critique (Oxford University Press 
2002), pp. 82–89. For a broader context, Edward, David, “Subsidiarity as a Legal Concept” 
in Cardonel, Pascaln Rosas, Allan, and Wahl, Nils (eds.) Constitutionalising the EU Judicial 
System: Essays in Honour of Pernilla Lindh (Hart 2012), pp. 93–103 at 93–94.
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national values can flourish.2 ‘Subsidiarity’ as a concept nevertheless remained 
ambiguous from the very beginning; Jacques Delors is said in 1992 to have face-
tiously offered a prize for its definition.3 A central issue is whether subsidiarity 
is a political or legal principle.4
Subsidiarity is part of the Union’s response to criticisms that EU law does not 
adequately address the appropriate balance between the Union and other levels 
of government5 and the democratic deficit.6 The Court has never annulled an 
EU measure on subsidiarity grounds.7 Some say the concept is a tool to justify 
exercise of EU powers rather than to limit them.8 If true, that finding vindi-
cates widespread skepticism. The perceived ineffectiveness of subsidiarity-based 
judicial review also led to the introduction of a formal system of subsidiarity 
control by national parliaments, the so-called ‘Early Warning System’ (EWS) 
detailed in Protocol 2. This, too has been the subject of numerous proposals for 
reform.9 Despite – or because of – pessimism about subsidiarity an effective 
limit to Union action both in the context of judicial review and the EWS pro-
cess, subsidiarity continues to attract significant recent academic attention.10 It 
2 Craig, Paul, “Subsidiarity: a political and legal analysis” Journal of Common Market Studies. 
1/2012, 72–87 p. 73.
3 Toth A.G., “A Legal Analysis of Subsidiarity” in O’Keeffe David, Twomey, Patrick M. (eds.), 
Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty (Wiley Chancery Law 1994), p. 37.
4 Working Group I of the European Convention on the Principle of Subsidiarity, Brussels, 23 
Sep. 2002, CONV 286/02, p. 2; Hettne, Jörgen, “Subsidiaritetsprincipen – juridisk gransk-
ning eller politisk kontroll?” SIEPS 2003:4; recently, Cooper, Ian, “Is the Subsidiarity Early 
Warning Mechanism a Legal or a Political Procedure? Three Questions and a Typology” EUI 
Working Paper RSCAS 18/2016.
5 Cass, Deborah Z., “The Word that Saves Maastricht? The Principle of Subsidiarity and 
the Division of Powers within the European Community” Common Market Law Review 
6/1992 pp. 1107–1136.
6 Rizzuto, Francesco, “National parliaments and the European Union: part of the problem 
or part of the solution to the democratic deficit in the European constitutional settlement?” 
Journal of Legislative Studies 3/2003, pp. 87–109.
7 Recently, Panara, Carlo, “The Enforceability of Subsidiarity in the EU and the Ethos of 
Cooperative Federalism: A Comparative Law Perspective” European Public Law 22/2016, 
pp. 305–351, p. 319. See however Case C-518/08 Fundación Gala-Salvador Dalí and Visual 
Entidad de Gestión de Artistas Plásticos (VEGAP) v Société des auteurs dans les arts graphiques 
et plastiques (ADAGP) and Others ECLI:EU:C:2010:191 p. I-3091 at para 33, concerning 
whether the Court would review French legislation which the Union legislature had already 
concluded it did not wish to harmonise on the basis of subsidiarity. The court declined, for 
that reason. Horsley, 2012, p. 273.
8 De Búrca, Gráinne, “The quest for legitimacy in the European Union” Modern Law Review 
3/1996, pp. 349–376, p. 366.
9 Davor, Jančić, “The game of cards: National parliaments in the EU and the future of the 
early warning mechanism and the political dialogue” Common Market Law Review 4/2015, 
pp. 939–976.
10 Bartl, Marija, “The Way We Do Europe: Subsidiarity and the Substantive Democratic Defi-
cit” European Law Journal 1/2015, pp. 23–43; Davies, Gareth, “Democracy and Legitimacy 
in the Shadow of Purposive Competence” European Law Journal 1/2015, pp. 2–22.
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is also of continued high-level interest to the institutions: subsidiarity was an 
element of the ‘Competence’ reviews at the 2016 FIDE congress.11
We examine subsidiarity control after the Lisbon Treaty from the perspective 
of these two control mechanisms. First, we recall the difficulty of defining and 
applying the subsidiarity principle. We then examine how key judgments of the 
Court of Justice treat subsidiarity claims from the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty to the end of 2016. This is followed by an examination of the activity of 
national parliaments’ using the Early Warning System during the same period. 
Detailed pre-legislative procedures and a variety of alternative mechanisms and 
concepts partly explains the rarity of successful subsidiarity challenges in either 
system. Current practice also confirms many widely held beliefs in so far as suc-
cess is measured by annulment or withdrawal. Nevertheless, the level of detail 
in recent judicial review cases and, after a quiet period, the continuing interest 
of national parliaments in 2016 suggests subsidiarity remains a topical issue. 
Reports of its death are greatly exaggerated.
2. WHAT, AND WHERE, IS SUBSIDIARITY?
Definitions of subsidiarity have been contested since the 1992 Edinburgh 
guidelines.12 One key question is whether subsidiarity in Article 5(3) TEU 
and proportionality in Article 5(4) TEU should overlap.13 Shortly after the 
Maastricht Treaty came into force even the EU institutions were unsure.14 After 
Lisbon, Article 5(3) TEU refers to the ‘Protocol on the application of the prin-
ciples of subsidiarity and proportionality’. However, neither the Protocol15 nor 
Article 5(4) encourage national parliaments to review proportionality.16 Inter-
pretation matters in the context of the EWS, because it can affect how state-
11 Ziller, Jacques, “General Report” pp. 115–117 and Iglesias, Maria, “Institutional Report” in 
Czuczai, Jeno, et. al. (eds.) Division of Competences and Regulatory Powers between the EU and 
the Member States (Wolters Kluwer 2016), pp. 186–190.
12 Steiner, Josephine, “Subsidiarity under the Maastricht Treaty”, pp. 49–64 and Emiliou, 
Nicholas, “Subsidiarity: Panacea or Fig Leaf?”, pp. 65–86, in O’Keefe, David and Twomey, 
Patrick (eds.), Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty (Chancery Law Publishing, Chichester) 
p. 49; Davies, Gareth, “Subsidiarity: The Wrong Idea, in the Wrong Place, at the Wrong 
Time” Common Market Law Review 1/2006, pp. 63–84; Estella, 2002, at 75, 98–99 and 101; 
Snyder, Francis, “Interinstitutional Agreements: Forms and Constitutional Limitations’ EUI 
Working Paper in Law 95/4.
13 Compare for example Toth, 1994 with Davies, Gareth, “The post-Laeken division of compe-
tences” European Law Review 5/2003, pp. 686–698.
14 Toth, 1994, p. 38.
15 Protocol 2, Article 6, first indent.
16 Groussot, Xavier, Bogojević, Sanja, “Subsidiarity as a Procedural Safeguard to Federalism” in 
Azoulai, Loic (eds.) The Question of Competence in the European Union (Oxford University 
Press 2014) 234–252, at 236–237, argue ‘in so far as’ in Article 5(3) refer to a proportionality 
assessment.
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ments from national parliaments are received.17 Diverging interpretations mean 
national parliaments with similar interests may take very different approaches 
to issuing reasoned opinions, as a comparison of Finnish18 and Swedish19 rea-
soned opinions reveals.20 In judicial review, Article 263 provides a wide range of 
benchmarks and therefore this distinction is less important. A similar range of 
possibilities is also open in indirect challenges under Article 267 TFEU.
The question of proportionality is also linked to whether EU measures pro-
vide added value or, as Öberg puts it, correct a transnational ‘market failure’.21 
In areas of exclusive competence now listed in Article 3 TFEU the principle 
does not apply; the EU is the only possible level of action.22 But elsewhere, 
it is sometimes argued that elements of necessity and proportionality require 
demonstrations of EU added value. Schütze suggested that the Court should 
treat subsidiarity as a type of ‘federal proportionality’, and engage in a deeper 
review of whether the EU acts have ‘unnecessarily restricted national autono-
my’.23 In a similar fashion, Davies has asked the Court to consider ‘whether 
the importance of the measure is sufficient to justify its effect on the Mem-
ber States’.24 Davies argued some case law should be read as the Court having 
accepted both the determination of the level of action and determination of 
17 See Report from the Commission Annual Report 2012 on Subsidiarity and Proportion-
ality Brussels, 30.7.2013 COM(2013) 566 final, p. 4; Conference of the Committees of 
the National Parliaments of the European Union Member States dealing with the Euro-
pean Union affairs as well as representatives of the European Parliament and the Eighteenth 
Bi-annual Report: Developments in European Union Procedures and Practices Relevant to 
Parliamentary Scrutiny, 27 September 2012.
18 Raunio, Tapio “The Finnish Eduskunta and the European Union: The Strengths and Weak-
nesses of a Mandating System” In Claudia Hefftler, Christine Neuhold, Olivier Rozenberg 
& Julie Smith (eds.) The Palgrave Handbook of National Parliaments and the European Union 
(Palgrave Macmillan Basingstoke 2015) p. 415–417; Miettinen, Samuli and Hyvärinen, 
Anna, “National Report Finland” in Czuczai, Jeno. et. al (eds.), Division of Competences and 
Regulatory Powers Between the EU and the Member States Congress Proceedings Vol. 3 (Wolters 
Kluwer 2016), pp. 375–376.
19 Jonsson Cornell, Anna “The Swedish Riksdag as scrutiniser of the principle of subsidiarity” 
European Constitutional Law Review 2/2016, pp. 294–317.
20 Cooper, Ian “The Nordic Parliaments and the EU” in Gron, Caroline. et al. (eds.), Still the 
other European Community? The Nordic Countries and the European Union (Routledge 2015); 
Cooper, Ian “The Subsidiarity Early Warning Mechanism: Three Questions and a Typology” 
and Jonsson Cornell, Anna “Similar but Different: Comparing the Scrutiny of the Principle 
of Subsidiarity in Sweden, Denmark and Finland” in Jonsson Cornell, Anna and Goldoni, 
Marco (eds.), National and Regional Parliaments in the EU-legislative Procedure post-Lisbon. 
The Impact of the Early Warning System (Hart 2016).
21 Öberg, Jacob “Subsidiarity as a Limit to the Exercise of EU Competences” Yearbook of Euro-
pean Law 2016, https://doi.org/10.1093/yel/yew027, p. 2.
22 Case C-288/11 P Mitteldeutsche Flughafen and Flughafen Leipzig-Halle v Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:821 para 79.
23 Schütze, Robert, “Subsidiarity after Lisbon: Reinforcing the Safeguards of Federalism?” Cam-
bridge Law Journal 3/2009 pp. 525–36 at 533–5. Horsley, 2012, at 272; Davies, 2006, at 
63–84.
24 Davies, 2006, at 83.
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whether the act goes beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives as part of the 
subsidiarity calculus.25
Early assessments of the Court’s case law on subsidiarity are typically critical 
of the Court’s ability to act as a counter-majoritarian institution.26 This view 
has persisted in later studies,27 which often support the view that ‘the princi-
ple’s core contribution to the integration process is a political principle in the 
pre-legislative arena’.28 Regardless of which definitions are used, the internal 
market has been seen as a circular justification.29 As Davies puts it, once the EU 
‘announces that it wishes to pursue an internal market objective, since these 
competences are defined in terms of creating uniformity, and Member States 
clearly cannot achieve this alone, subsidiarity no longer applies’.30 Seen from 
this quite critical perspective, subsidiarity ‘serves primarily as a masking princi-
ple, presenting a centralizing polity in a decentralizing light.’31
3. SUBSIDIARITY BEFORE THE COURT OF JUSTICE
The first of two principal subsidiarity review mechanisms involves judicial 
review before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). If subsidi-
arity is hard to define, conventional wisdom considers it at least equally hard to 
review. Toth’s 1994 claim was remarkably prescient:
‘all that the Court may be expected to do… is to examine whether in arriving at its 
decision the council has not committed a manifest error or a misuse of powers or 
has not patently exceeded the bounds of its discretion.’32
The intensity of judicial review remains a focal point in both literature and the 
case law from Luxembourg after November 2009. Few commentators on the 
25 Case C–491/01 The Queen v Secretary of State for Health, ex parte British American Tobacco 
(Investments) Ltd and Imperial Tobacco Ltd ECLI:EU:C:2002:741, p. I–11453 at 184 and 
122–141. See also Davies, 2003, at 693, who notes: “[t]he obvious conclusion [to draw from 
the omission of proportionality] is that proportionality is an element of subsidiarity; thus 
national parliaments must be informed of the former to assess the latter”.
26 De Búrca, Gráinne, “The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Court of Justice as an Institutional 
Actor” Journal of Common Market Studies 36/1998, pp. 217–235; Estella, 2002, at 140–176.
27 Cooper, Ian “The Watchdogs of Subsidiarity: National Parliaments and the Logic of Arguing 
in the EU” Journal of Common Market Studies 2/2006, pp. 281–304.
28 Horsley, Thomas, “Subsidiarity and the European Court of Justice: Missing Pieces in the 
Subsidiarity Jigsaw?” Journal of Common Market Studies 2/2012, 267–283, at 267.
29 Davies, 2006, pp. 63–84.
30 Ibid, p. 75. Similarly, from a ‘choice of legal basis’ perspective, Weatherill, Stephen, “The 
Limits of Legislative Harmonization Ten Years after Tobacco Advertsing: How the Court’s 
Case Law has become a “Drafting Guide” German Law Journal 3/2011, 827–864; Ten years 
prior, Emiliou, 1994, at 75. The argument remains central to Davies, 2015, Pages 2–22.
31 Davies, 2006, pp. 77.
32 Toth, A.G., “Is subsidiarity justiciable?” European Law Review 3/1994, pp. 268–285, p. 284.
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pre-Lisbon subsidiarity case law consider the principle an effective limit on 
EU action.33 However, even pre-Lisbon cases incrementally add small elements 
to the Court’s working methods when it evaluates subsidiarity claims. Thus, 
judicial review of subsidiarity should not be seen as stagnant even though no 
single case clearly annuls legislation based purely on subsidiarity concerns. This 
progress continues after Lisbon.
Pessimism about subsidiarity in judicial review has not delivered recent sub-
sidiarity-linked litigation before the Court of Justice.34 However, only a handful 
of judgments offer new insight into subsidiarity. This in itself suggests that the 
discussion on subsidiarity takes place primarily outside the context of judicial 
review. No judgment offers the ultimate prize in which subsidiarity leads to 
annulment. The Court nevertheless arguably develops the doctrine on subsidi-
arity review and perhaps even views some claims more sympathetically than 
33 Arnull, Anthony, et al. (eds.) “Is the European Union an Organisation of Limited Powers?’, A 
Constitutional Order of States? Essays in EU Law in Honour of Alan Dashwood” (Hart 2011), at 
3 and Craig, Paul, Administrative Law (Oxford University Press 2012, 2nd edition), at 395.
34 Cases involving references to subsidiarity 1.12.2009–31.12.2016 include: T-16/04 Arcelor 
v Parliament and Council ECLI:EU:T:2010:54 para 179; T-429/05 Artegodan v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:2010:60 para 75; T-31/07 Du Pont de Nemours (France) and Others v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:2013:167 para 205; T-336/07 Telefónica and Telefónica de España v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:2012:172 paras 296–305; T-76/08 EI du Pont de Nemours and Others v Com-
mission ECLI:EU:T:2012:46 paras 202–205; T-526/10 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v 
Commission ECLI:EU:T:2013:215 paras 78–84; T-434/11 Europäisch-Iranische Handelsbank v 
Council ECLI:EU:T:2013:405 paras 172–184; T-295/12 Germany v Commission ECLI:EU:T: 
2014:675 paras 174–176; T-309/12 Zweckverband Tierkörperbeseitigung v Commission ECLI: 
EU:T:2014:676 paras 217–219; T-255/13 Italy v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2015:838 paras 
177–179; T-257/13 Poland v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2015:111 paras 173–180; T-461/13 
Spain v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2015:891 paras 180–182; T-614/13 Romonta v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:2014:835 para 105; T-629/13 Molda v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2014:834 para 103; 
T-103/14 Frucona Košice v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2016:152 para 64; C-518/07 Commission 
v Germany ECLI:EU:C:2010:125 paras 52–53; C-58/08 Vodafone and Others ECLI:EU:C: 
2010:321 paras 72–75; C-343/08 Commission v Czech Republic ECLI:EU:C:2010:14 para 
60; C-518/08 Fundación Gala-Salvador Dalí and VEGAP ECLI:EU:C:2010:191 para 
32; C-176/09 Luxembourg v Parliament and Council ECLI:EU:C:2011:290 paras 76–79; 
C-504/09 P Commission v Poland ECLI:EU:C:2012:178 para 79; C-505/09 P Commission 
v Estonia ECLI:EU:C:2012:179 para 81; C-521/09 PDEP – Elf Aquitaine v Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:644 para 78; C-539/09 Commission v Germany ECLI:EU:C:2011:733 paras 
40–48; C-221/10 P Artegodan v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2012:216 para 75; C-288/11 P 
Mitteldeutsche Flughafen and Flughafen Leipzig-Halle v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2012:821 para 
79; C-373/11 Panellinios Syndesmos Viomichanion Metapoiisis Kapnou ECLI:EU:C:2013: 
567 para 24; C-422/11 P Prezes Urzędu Komunikacji Elektronicznej and Republic of Poland 
v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2012:553 paras 38–40; C-295/12 P Telefónica and Telefónica de 
España v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2014:2062 paras 134–135; C-525/12 Commission v Ger-
many ECLI:EU:C:2014:2202 para 36; C-410/13 Baltlanta ECLI:EU:C:2014:2134 para 43; 
C-508/13 Estonia v Parliament and Council ECLI:EU:C:2015:403 paras 44–45; C-276/14 
Gmina Wrocław ECLI:EU:C:2015:635 para 41; C-358/14 Poland v Parliament and Council 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:323 paras 111–127; C-477/14 Pillbox 38 ECLI:EU:C:2016:324 paras 
142–151; C-547/14 Philip Morris Brands and Others ECLI:EU:C:2016:325 paras 213–227. 
We have used as proxy the Commission’s reports from 2010–2015 but also consider the case 
law of the Court of Justice from 2016 with explicit subsidiarity references.
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early commentators might expect. Subsidiarity is recognized as a matter for 
judicial review, and in some cases examined in light of additional evidence 
beyond the institutions’ own preparatory works. Even ardent critics of the 
Court’s standards should recognize that they are evolving.
In Vodafone, the first high-profile subsidiarity case to be judged by the Court 
of Justice after the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, the Court’s review rec-
ognizes the importance of reasoning in pre-legislative documents. The Court 
considers the discretion of the legislature to harmonize telecoms charges.35 A 
key test is whether the legislature has exceeded the limits of its discretion.36 
Reactions to the judgment were muted, if not surprised.37 As Advocate General 
Maduro suggested in his opinion, ‘the Court is not substituting its judgment 
for that of the Community legislator but simply compelling it to take sub-
sidiarity seriously.’38 Vodafone is notable because of the Court’s acknowledge-
ment that impact assessments provide evidence relevant to judicial review.39 The 
evidence becomes something of an essential procedural requirement despite 
having no explicit basis in the Treaties themselves.40 Nevertheless, that judg-
ment did not provide much encouragement that judicial review would question 
impact assessments.
The 2011 judgment in Luxembourg vs Parliament and Council confirms both 
perspectives: Impact assessments are relevant,41 but also unlikely to offer evi-
dence in favour of annulment. The case concerned Directive 2009/12 which 
imposed rules applicable on airports with at least a certain number of passen-
gers. If no such airport was in a Member State, the rules applied to the airport in 
35 Regulation (EC) No 717/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 
2007 on roaming on public mobile telephone networks within the Community and amend-
ing Directive 2002/21/EC OJ L 171, 29.6.2007; Vodafone, paras 51–71.
36 Ibid, paras 68–70.
37 The Court, unlike AG Maduro, does not itself review arguments for why a common approach 
is required but accepts this is the case. Brenncke, Martin, “Case C-58/08, Vodafone Ltd and 
Others v. Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, Judgment of the 
Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 8 June 2010” Common Market Law Review 6/2010, pp. 
1793–1814, at 1813.
38 AG Maduro at point 30 of the Opinion to Vodafone. Hettne, Jörgen and Langdal, Fredrik, 
“Does Subsidiarity Ask the Right Question?” Think Global – Act European (TGAE) 2011, 
p. 354.
39 Case Vodafone, paras 5, 45, 55, 58 and 65; Wimmer Micheal “The Dinghy’s Rudder: General 
Principles of European Union Law through the Lens of Proportionality” European Public Law 
2/2014, pp. 331–353, p. 351.
40 Keyaerts, David, “Ex ante evaluation of EU legislation intertwined with judicial review? 
Comment on Vodafone Ltd v Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform (C-58/08)” (Case Comment) European Law Review 6/2010, pp. 869–884 at p. 877.
41 Alemanno, Alberto and Meuwese, Anne, “Impact Assessment of EU Non Legislative Rule-
making: The Missing Link in ‘New Comitology” European Law Journal 1/2013, pp. 76–92, 
p. 79; Curtin Deirdre, Hofmann Herwig and Mendes Joana, “Constitutionalising EU Exec-
utive Rule-Making Procedures: A Research Agenda” European Law Journal 1/2013, pp. 1–21, 
p. 15.
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each Member State which had the highest passenger numbers. This, according 
to Luxembourg was contrary to the principles of proportionality and subsidiar-
ity because its capital airport was subject to the rule regardless of the numbers of 
passengers whereas other, larger member states had many airports not subject to 
similar requirements. The Court dismissed the claim that national rules could 
be sufficient because this was not pleaded by Luxembourg to sufficient detail.42 
This signaled the Court was open in principle to such evidence but not required 
to obtain it on its own.
Several years after Luxembourg v Parliament and Council are characterized by 
minor developments before the General Court. In 2012, the Court confirmed 
State Aid as an area of exclusive competence not subject to subsidiarity in Mit-
teldeutsche Flughafen.43 In the Artedogan judgment it dismissed subsidiarity as 
a principle giving rise to individual rights and thus non-contractual liability of 
the Union.44 In 2013, the General Court delivered two notable judgments on 
the principle. In Case T-31/07, Du Pont de Nemours and Others v Commission, 
the General Court confirmed its earlier case law that where an instrument of 
EU law confers Union bodies exclusive competences, their exercise is not sub-
ject to the subsidiarity principle.45 Directive 91/414/EC conferred exclusive 
competence on EU authorities to assess active substances that may be used 
in plant protection products and to place restrictions on their acceptance. A 
measure adopted in the exercise of that competence was held not to be cov-
ered by the principle of subsidiarity. In Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v 
Commission,46 a Commission Regulation laying down detailed rules on trade in 
seal products47 was claimed to breach the principle of subsidiarity. The General 
Court noted the objective of the basic regulation was to improve the function-
ing of the internal market, rather than the animal welfare objectives suggested 
by the applicants.48 As the GC put it, ‘the improvement of the conditions of 
functioning of the internal market, taking into account the protection of ani-
mal welfare.’49 This cannot be satisfactorily achieved by action undertaken only 
in the Member States and requires action at Union level.50 The ‘market failure’ 
42 Case Luxembourg v Parliament and Council, para 80.
43 Case Mitteldeutsche Flughafen and Flughafen Leipzig-Halle v Commission.
44 Case Artegodan v Commission, Artegodan, para 82.
45 Case T-31/07 Du Pont de Nemours (France) and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2013:167 
Para 203, 205 and T-334/07 Cases T-420/05 R Vischim v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2009:391, 
para 223, Denka International v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2009:453, para 200.
46 Case Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Commission.
47 Regulation (EC) No 1007/2009 of 16 September 2009 on trade in seal products OJ L 286, 
31.10.2009.
48 Case Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, para 35.
49 Paras 83 and 64.
50 Para 85.
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caused by divergent national law demonstrated a need to harmonize national 
provisions which regulate placing seal products on the market.51
The next judgment of note, Estonia v Parliament and Council,52 involves 
concerns related to accounting rules in Directive 2013/34/EU.53 This judgment 
dismisses a number of arguments that would, if successful, have confirmed a 
more intense subsidiarity review. Estonia argued that a specific provision in the 
directive failed to comply with the principle of subsidiarity.54 This approach 
was rejected: Subsidiarity review involves concerns the instrument as a whole 
and not each of its provisions individually.55 Nor need the legislator consider 
the position of specific member states individually when reviewing subsidiarity 
pleas: the legislature must only ensure that the action ‘can, by reason of its scale 
or effects, be better achieved at Union level’.56 The technical choices in the 
instrument did not require specific individual statements of reasons.57 Worse 
still for advocates of strict judicial review, a state could not claim a failure to 
state reasons when it was a participant in the legislative procedure leading to the 
adoption of the instrument.58
Despite a poor outlook in 2014–2015, three judgments delivered on 4 May 
2016 suggest judicial subsidiarity review remains viable. In a fitting contin-
uation of a classic theme, tobacco regulation, Poland supported by Romania 
challenged Directive 2014/40/EU. This sought to further regulate mentho-
lated tobacco products in the Union.59 Two other judgments were references 
brought in national proceedings involving the same instrument; one criticizing 
standardized (plain) packaging, and the other focused on new regulation for 
electronic cigarettes.60
In Poland v Parliament and Council, Poland argued in essence that local con-
ditions required local solutions.61 Poland also pleaded that the recital’s reference 
51 See case Mitteldeutsche Flughafen and Flughafen Leipzig-Halle v Commission paras 38 and 39. 
See also case Spain v Commission, paras 181–182.
52 Case C-508/13 Estonia v Parliament and Council ECLI:EU:C:2015:403; Report from the 
Commission 21014 Annual Report 2014 on Subsidiarity and Proportionality 2.7.2015 
COM(2015) 315 final, p. 8, noting an absence of significant judgments.
53 Directive 2013/34/EU of 26 June 2013 on the annual financial statements, consolidated 
financial statements and related reports of certain types of undertakings, amending Directive 
2006/43/EC and repealing Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC OJ L 182, 
29.6.2013.
54 Case Estonia v Parliament and Council, para 41.
55 Ibid, at 51. The court considered this a question of the duty to state reasons, but this plea also 
failed because the applicant was party to the legislative process. See also Poland v Parliament 
and Council at 119.
56 Case Estonia v Parliament and Council para 53.
57 Para 60.
58 Para 61.
59 Case Poland v Parliament and Council, paras 111–127.
60 Cases Pillbox 38 and Philip Morris Brands.
61 Case Poland v Parliament and Council, Polish pleas at 106.
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to subsidiarity was ‘a standard formula’ with no real significance in light of the 
principle of subsidiarity and thus a failure to state reasons in respect of subsidi-
arity.62 The institutions and interveners argued that subsidiarity was adequately 
considered in the impact assessment, and that in any event other recitals which 
did not expressly mention subsidiarity nevertheless satisfied the duty to state 
reasons.63 The Court starts out strong: it ‘must verify both compliance with the 
substantive conditions set out in Article 5(3) TEU and compliance with the 
procedural safeguards provided for by that Protocol.’64 The standard remains 
whether ‘whether the EU legislature was entitled to consider, on the basis of 
a detailed statement, that the objective of the proposed action could be better 
achieved at EU level.’65 Harmonization, remains, however, its own justification. 
Even if one of the objectives of the instrument
‘might be better attained at the level of Member States… the fact remains that pur-
suing it at that level would be liable to entrench, if not create, situations in which 
some Member States permitted the placing on the market of tobacco products con-
taining certain characterising flavours, whilst others prohibit it, thus running com-
pletely counter to the first objective of Directive 2014/40, namely the improvement 
of the functioning of the internal market for tobacco and related products.’66
Thus, the interdependence of internal market and health-promoting objectives 
in the directive allowed the EU legislature to
‘…legitimately take the view that it had to establish a set of rules for the placing on 
the EU market of tobacco products with characterising flavours and that, because 
of that interdependence, those two objectives could best be achieved at EU level.67
In what might be considered a subtle, but quite significant development in the 
intensity of review, the Court admitted new evidence brought by the claim-
ant to contradict subsidiarity claims in the preparatory work.68 The applicant 
had brought evidence to support claims that the consumption of mentholated 
tobacco products is in essence limited in Poland, Slovakia and Finland and that 
62 That recital reads: “(60) Since the objectives of this Directive, namely to approximate the 
laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning the manu-
facture, presentation and sale of tobacco and related products, cannot be sufficiently achieved 
by the Member States, but can rather, by reason of their scale and effects, be better achieved at 
Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity 
as set out in Article 5 TEU. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out 
in that Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those 
objectives.”




67 Section at 118, referring to Vodafone and Others, paragraph 78, and Estonia v Parliament and 
Council, paragraph 48.
68 Para 120.
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therefore the secondary objective of protecting human health in the internal 
market context could have been better achieved at the national level. Thus, the 
judgment could be read as a confirmation that evidence contradicting subsidi-
arity claims made in preparatory documents is not only admissible but seri-
ously considered by the Court of Justice. As the Court notes, the directive 
and its impact assessment include ‘sufficient information showing clearly and 
unequivocally the advantages of taking action at EU level’.69 This could be read 
as a further signal indicating the willingness of the Court to consider contrary 
evidence. It could, after all, have developed the rule that as a participant in the 
legislative proceedings Poland was precluded from challenging the statement of 
reasons regarding the choice of measures.70 The judgment also clarifies the legal 
standard for subsidiarity statements of reasons. According to the Court, the 
legislation and its preparatory material
‘established to the requisite legal standard that that information enabled both the 
EU legislature and national Parliaments to determine whether the proposal com-
plied with the principle of subsidiarity, whilst also enabling individuals to under-
stand the grounds relating to that principle and the Court to exercise its power of 
review.’71
In the second subsidiarity-related judgment, Pillbox 38,72 the UK High Court 
referred a question concerning the validity of Article 20 of the Directive. The 
contested provision imposed regulatory requirements for electronic cigarettes 
and refill containers, including an advertising ban. The Court dismisses rea-
soned opinions as evidence of a breach of subsidiarity. Reasoned opinions ‘are 
part of the mechanism in connection with the political monitoring of compli-
ance with that principle established by that protocol… the Court must review 
only compliance with the procedural safeguards provided for by that proto-
col.’73 As to the substantive subsidiarity revision? in Article 5(3) TFEU, ‘the 
Court must examine whether the EU legislature was entitled to consider, on 
the basis of a detailed statement, that the objective of the proposed action could 
be better achieved at EU level.’74 The Court reviewed new evidence purporting 
to challenge claims that national differences existed, but found that there were 
indeed such differences (and thus a reason to harmonize legislation).75
69 Para 123.
70 Case Estonia v Parliament and Council, paragraph 62 and Poland v Parliament and Council 
paragraph 125.
71 Poland v Parliament and Council, para 124.
72 Case Pillbox 38, especially paras 142–151.
73 Para 147.
74 Para 148.
75 Paras 57, 112 and 150.
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The Third judgment, Philip Morris Brands,76 includes a subsidiarity challenge 
against the prohibition on menthol as a characterizing flavor for tobacco prod-
ucts.77 The Court addressed only part of the subsidiarity pleas because the ref-
erence itself only explained the referring Court’s subsidiarity concerns as regards 
a single article of the directive.78 Was the legislature ‘entitled to consider, on the 
basis of a detailed statement, that the objective of the proposed action could be 
better achieved at EU level’?79 Here, too, the conflation of public health goals 
into an overall internal market objective80 helps demonstrate subsidiarity of EU 
level action.81 The interdependence of the two objectives meant that they could, 
read in tandem, be best achieved at EU level.82 Sufficient reasons were given: 
‘the Commission’s proposal for a directive and its impact assessment include 
sufficient information showing clearly and unequivocally the advantages of tak-
ing action at EU level rather than at Member State level.’83 It is interesting to 
hypothesize how an answer to the question might be framed if the statement of 
reasons did not clearly and unequivocally show such advantages.
What is the standard for evaluating reasoning in legislative proposals? 
Early comments on these cases perceive the triplet of judgments as ‘a defer-
ential approach to the policy choices underpinning the Directive’ and note 
the importance of international conventions as inspiration for also the Union’s 
policy choices.84 They also note, however, that the Court deals with the issues 
in a detailed manner and continue to engage with the arguments, examine 
the effectiveness of alternative policy choices, and support conclusions with 
a robust selection of sources.85 Even if AG Kokott’s approach – whether the 
Union’s political institutions have kept within the limits of their discretion – is 
viewed as weak,86 the limits of that discretion are increasingly viewed in a rather 
evidence-based way.
76 Case Philip Morris Brands and Others, paras 213–227.
77 Question 7 referred to the Court of Justice reads: “Is [Directive 2014/40] and in particular 
Articles 7, 8(3), 9(3), 10(l)(g), 13 and 14 invalid for failure to comply with the principle of 
subsidiarity?”
78 Paragraphs 51–52, declaring the remainder of question 7 inadmissible in other respects and 
213–214 for the same as regards subsidiarity.
79 Para 218.
80 As the Court states in paras 143 and 220, “…Directive 2014/40 has two objectives in that 
it seeks to facilitate the smooth functioning of the internal market for tobacco and related 
products, while ensuring a high level of protection of human health, especially for young 
people.”
81 Para 221; compare the similar Poland v Parliament and Council paragraph 117, above.
82 Para 222; see also Vodafone and Others, para 78, and Estonia v Parliament and Council, para 
48.
83 Para 226.
84 See “Reviewing harmonization: the Tobacco Products Directive judgments” (Editorial) Euro-
pean Law Review 3/2016, p. 306.
85 Ibid.
86 Bartlett, Oliver “The EU’s competence gap in public health and non-communicable disease 
policy” Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 1/2016, pp. 50–81, p. 69.
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The review of post-Lisbon case law shows subsidiarity is in principle justi-
ciable,87 but in practice difficult to challenge before the Court. The problems 
in judicial review were clearly evident to commentators at the time of its intro-
duction.88 Whilst many of the decisions represent further limits to subsidiarity 
review, the 2016 Poland v Parliament and Council judgment may, in its review 
of the external evidence, represent progress towards more detailed review. It at 
the very least shows Court is willing to entertain external evidence which might 
refute the claims of the legislature.
Why are there no successful annulment actions? It is regularly suggested 
that this is a function of the limited number of cases and because there are 
often good grounds for EU-level action in the cases that have been brought.89 
Some suggest it is only because ‘a viable methodology and testing standards 
have not yet been thrashed out.90 Nothing in the case law to date suggests 
subsidiarity review is impossible. Quite the contrary, we agree a change may 
arise a case where the case for legislation is not adequately made and where as 
a consequence a measure may be annulled. It may even happen with reference 
to external evidence produced by parties to an annulment case. Litigation does 
not suffer from the myopic approach to subsidiarity found in the context of 
the Early Warning System. Applicants are perfectly at liberty to argue all fac-
tors that contribute to the allocation and exercise of competence. The same 
annulment action, or the same preliminary reference can raise questions of legal 
basis, subsidiarity and proportionality without difficulty, again evident in the 
triplet of tobacco regulation judgments from May 2016. They may even plead 
national constitutional identity. However, the criticism levelled at the intensity 
of subsidiarity review are equally applicable to review focusing on proportion-
ality or legal bases. Member States have arguably been equally unsuccessful 
on all direct fronts of assault. Literature nevertheless suggests the intensity of 
subsidiarity review varies across eras.91 If that is so, arguably review based on 
87 After Lisbon, e.g. Vodafone paras 72–78.
88 Robinson, William, “The Court of Justice after Maastricht” in O’Keeffe and Twomey, 1994, 
179–192 at p. 189; Bermann, George, “The Lisbon Treaty: The Irish “No”. National Parlia-
ments and Subsidiarity: An Outsider’s View” European Constitutional Review 3/2008, pp. 
453–459 at 458; Weatherill, 2013, at 853, Bogojevic and Groussout, in Azoulai, 2014, 241; 
Biondi, 2012 at 213; Barbier de la Serre and Sibony, “Expert Evidence before the EC Courts” 
Common Market Law Review 4/2008, pp. 941–985.
89 Van Nuffel, Piet, “The Protection of Member States’ Regions Through the Subsidiarity Prin-
ciple” in Panara, Carlo and De Becker, Alexander (eds.) The Role of the Regions in EU Govern-
ance (Springer 2011), at 65–66, and Craig, 2012, at 50, 72, 80; Panara, 2016, at. 319.
90 Davor, 2015, at 942, 974 and 944.
91 Bradley, Kieran St. C., “Legislating in the European Union” in Barnard, Catherine, Peers, Ste-
ven (eds.) European Union Law (Oxford University Press 2014) at 115 cites case C-142/84 – 
BAT and Reynolds v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1987:490 at 180 as the turning point, where the 
Court accepts there is subsidiarity review; but compare Vodafone at 78 also cited by Bradley 
as contra; Harlow, Carol, Rawlings, Richard, “Process and Procedure in EU Administration” 
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impact assessments and carefully scrutinizing legislative proposals represents a 
modern era of more intense review.92
Subsidiarity might also be redefined in a way more open to judicial review 
than is currently the case in the context of Article 5(3) TFEU or Protocol 2. 
The Amsterdam Protocol included more detail, and referred to ‘transnational 
aspects which cannot be satisfactorily regulated by action by Member States’ 
and situations where ‘actions by Member States alone… would conflict with the 
requirements of the Treaty (such as the need… to avoid disguised restrictions 
on trade …)’.93 Reintroducing such a text could improve and develop judicial 
tests. Nevertheless, many of these are also issues in determining competence, 
for example in the context of the internal market legal basis, and thus already 
open to judicial review. The cure- strict judicial review- may also be worse than 
the disease. Panara notes that in Germany, where subsidiarity remains of some 
interest,94 improved definitions defined and a change in the Bundesverfassungs-
gericht doctrine led to successful subsidiarity challenges.95 The ultimate out-
come, however, was a constitutional amendment which made the test less strict 
and thus watered down strict judicial review.
4. SUBSIDIARITY AND THE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM
After the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, national parliaments are invited 
to consider the subsidiarity of legislative proposals under the so-called ‘early 
warning system’ (EWS), detailed in Protocol 2 to the Treaties. This was linked 
to a broader aim of involving national parliaments.96 Where they consider that 
a draft proposal infringes the principle of subsidiarity, they may submit a Rea-
soned Opinion (RO) to the Commission. Each national parliament has two 
votes which, depending on the bicameral nature of the parliament, may be 
issued independently by each chamber. Two mechanisms are set out in Article 
7 of the Protocol. The so called ‘yellow card’ requires either one third or, in the 
area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ) one fourth of allocated votes. The 
‘orange card’ requires a simple majority in the ordinary legislative procedure. 
Triggering either procedure requires the Commission to review the legislation 
and consider amending or withdrawing the proposal. The ‘orange card’ allows 
(Hart 2014), p. 44, citing Commission v Poland and Commission v Poland and Estonia, cited 
as “perhaps the closest the CJEU has come to invoking subsidiarity”.
92 E.g. Vandenbruwaene, Werner, “Multitiered Political Questions: The ECJ’s Mandate in 
Enforcing Subsidiarity” Legisprudence 3/2012, pp. 321–345, suggesting this de lege ferenda.
93 Protocol (No 30) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, 
Article 5.
94 FIDE General Report on Competence for 2016, p. 115. In 2016 there were no UK or Aus-
trian reports, in the UK case clearly not because there were no subsidiarity concerns.
95 Panara, 2016, at 313–314.
96 See also Protocol 1 on National Parliaments.
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the Council or EP to stop the legislative procedure. Three yellow cards have 
been issued by the end of 2016. No orange cards have been issued. Whilst 
one proposal was withdrawn for other reasons, no yellow card resulted in the 
withdrawal of a proposal for the reason that the Commission considers it breaches 
the principle of subsidiarity. After a period involving very few ROs in 2014 and 
2015, national parliaments have issued a large number in 2016.
What ‘subsidiarity’ means in the context of the EWS remains debatable. The 
confusion can be traced in part to the working group’s structure of the conven-
tion: there was a subsidiarity, but not a proportionality, working group in the 
Convention on the Future of Europe.97 The final report of the working group 
on subsidiarity suggested the principle should be best understood as a political 
concept, as ‘too vague to lend itself to objective interpretations… so the best 
way to avoid disgruntlement is to bring all levels of political representation 
within the process, and attempt to ensure their concerns are taken account of.’98 
The Commission’s impact assessment guidelines reflect the distinction between 
subsidiarity and proportionality: Under guidelines first issued in 2005,99 three 
tests included proportionality elements,100 under newer guidelines published in 
2009,101 the third test was deleted because it was linked to proportionality rather 
than subsidiarity.102 Some writers on national parliaments have maintained that 
the subsidiarity concept should, for the purposes of the Early Warning System, 
be interpreted more broadly than the Commission’s practice acknowledges.103 
The Commission has treated the issuing of a Reasoned Opinion as a matter for 
national parliaments ROs which appear to address issues other than subsidiarity 
in the strict sense, treats them as a RO.104
Are reasoned opinions effective? Even in cases where the threshold is not 
reached yellow cards signal a diminished likelihood that the proposal will be 
passed. The Commission’s annual reviews of the application of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality illustrate a progressive deepening of national 
97 Stephen Weatherill’s evidence to the HL select committee, 7 December 2004, cited in Kon-
stantinides, 2009, at 119.
98 Davies, 2003, at p. 694, citing Final Report of the Working Group on Subsidiarity, CONV 
286/02 at 2, point 5.
99 Impact Assessment Guidelines SEC 2005 791 final.
100 Necessity, added value, that EU action is limited to what Member States cannot achieve 
satisfactorily and to what the Union can do better.
101 SEC 2009 92, Impact Assessment Guidelines.
102 Bogojevic and Groussout in Azoulai, 2014, at 242–243.
103 Kiiver, Philipp, The Early Warning System for the Principle of Subsidiarity: Constitutional 
theory and empirical reality (Routledge 2012), pp. 69–91, analyzing both the definitions 
and the Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the 
European Union (COSAC) practice in selected cases.
104 Letter from President Barroso and Vice-president Wallström of 1 December 2009, Annex 
p. 4, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/relations/relations_other/npo/docs/letter_
en.pdf (Accessed 4.1.2017).
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parliaments’ subsidiarity review.105 Before the first ‘yellow card’ in 2012, very 
few proposals attracted sufficient reasoned opinions to warrant a mention. The 
annual reports regularly observe that Reasoned Opinions remain a small per-
centage of all of the contributions received from national parliaments in the 
context of political dialogue.106 A revised definition of subsidiarity, mooted 
above as a solution to concerns about judicial review, might also improve some 
national parliaments’ position. The improvement would be marginal if such 
concerns are equally effective when they receive a political dialogue response, 
and more so if those national parliaments have chosen to disengage for domes-
tic or resource reasons. This invites further research.
Summarizing the year 2009, when the procedure is first available, the Com-
mission noted that ‘where compliance is questioned, the actors involved in 
discussions hold a broad variety of views. This is the case not only between the 
different institutions, but also within these institutions, and sometimes between 
the different actors of the same Member State.”107 By the end of 2010, 82 draft 
legislative proposals falling within the scope of the Protocol had received 211 
documents issued as ROs but according to the Commission, only 34 raised 
subsidiarity concerns.108 Only five legislative proposals received more than one 
reasoned opinion.109 The most controversial, on seasonal workers, received only 
nine critical Reasoned Opinions but an equal number of opinions supporting 
the proposal.110
In 2011, 64 reasoned opinions were received on a total of 28 Commission 
proposals. No proposal exceeded the threshold for a yellow card, but the Com-
mon Consolidated Corporate Tax Base111 received nine ROs worth 13 votes, the 
105 We rely on the Commission’s annual reviews for statistics for 2010–2015 but develop our 
own for 2016 based on the IPEX database as of 4.1.2017.
106 Report from the Commission 2012, p. 3–4; Report from the Commission Annual Report 
2013 on Subsidiarity and Proportionality Brussels, 5.8.2014 COM(2014) 506 final, p. 4.
107 Report from the Commission on Subsidiarity and Proportionality (17th report on Better 
Lawmaking covering the year 2009) 8.10.2010 COM/2010/0547 final, p. 11.
108 Report from the Commission on Subsidiarity and Proportionality Brussels (18th report on 
Better Lawmaking covering the year 2010), 10.6.2011 COM(2011) 344 final, p. 4.
109 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions 
of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of seasonal employment, 
COM(2010) 379 final; Proposal for a Directive … /…/ EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on Deposit Guarantee Schemes [recast], COM(2010) 368 final; Proposal for 
a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Regulations 
(EC) No 1290/2005 and (EC) No 1234/2007, as regards distribution of food products to the 
most deprived persons in the Union, COM(2010) 486 final; Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 
on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development 
(EAFRD), COM(2010) 537 final; Direct Support Scheme for Farmers, COM(2010) 539, 
and the Investor Compensation Scheme, COM(2010) 371 final.
110 Seasonal Workers Directive, COM(2010) 379 final.
111 Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) 
COM(2011) 121 final.
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proposal on the temporary reintroduction of border controls at internal bor-
ders in exceptional circumstances112 six ROs, and both the Common European 
Sales Law113 and the Single Common Market Organization Regulation114 five 
ROs.115 As of 1.1.2017, none of these have been passed. A relatively high num-
ber of votes clearly indicates difficulties in passing a proposal because it also 
serves as a proxy for the position of national governments.116
In 2012, the Commission received 70 ROs.117 The first yellow card was 
issued in 2012 concerning the proposal for a Regulation on the exercise of the 
right to take collective action within the context of the freedom of establish-
ment and the freedom to provide services.118 This was the only proposal to come 
close to reaching the threshold, with 12 ROs representing 19 votes. The next 
most controversial proposal received only five reasoned opinions.119 Only the 
later has been passed.
The proposal on collective action sought to restate the relationship between 
the labour rights and the exercise of freedom of establishment and to provide 
services enshrined in the Treaty, according to the Commission,120 considered 
in the Viking121 and Laval122 judgments. The Commission, as well as some aca-
demics,123 saw the ROs as raising a range of issues beyond the narrow Protocol 
2 definition of subsidiarity. These included its legal basis,124 the added value of 
the proposal as opposed to the status quo, and the necessity for the proposal EU 
alternative dispute settlement mechanism.125 In its responses to national parlia-
ments, the Commission suggested the proposal complied with subsidiarity but 
concluded that the widespread concerns were a proxy for Council votes and 
112 Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 in order to provide for common rules 
on the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders in exceptional circum-
stances COM(2011) 560 final.
113 Proposal for a Regulation on a Common European Sales Law Brussels, COM(2011)635 
final.
114 Regulation establishing a common organisation of agricultural markets and on specific pro-
visions for certain agricultural products (‘Single CMO Regulation’), COM(2010) 799 final.
115 Report from the Commission 2011, p. 4.
116 This confirms predictions made by i.a. Raunio, Tapio, “Destined for Irrelevance Subsidiarity 
Control by National Parliaments (WP)” ARENA Paper 36/2010, p. 13.
117 Report from the Commission 2012, p. 3.
118 Ibid, p. 7.
119 Proposal for a Regulation on the Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived, COM(2012) 
617 final.
120 Report from the Commission 2012, p. 7.
121 Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v 
Viking Line European Community Court ECLI:EU:C:2007:772.
122 Case C-341/05 Laval v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet ECLI:EU:C:2007:809.
123 See Fabbrini, Federico, Granat, Katarzyna “”Yellow card, but no foul”: The role of the 
national parliaments under the subsidiarity protocol and the Commission proposal for an 
EU regulation on the right to strike” Common Market Law Review 1/2013, pp. 115–143.
124 TFEU article 352, considering article 153 excludes the right to strike from Union harmoni-
sation.
125 Report from the Commission 2012, p. 7.
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therefore the proposal was politically unworkable. As a result, the proposal was 
withdrawn for reasons presented as political expediency rather than subsidiarity 
concerns.126
In 2013, 88 reasoned opinions were received by the Commission.127 A sec-
ond yellow card was issued, this time on the proposal for the establishment of 
the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO). National Parliaments issued 
13 reasoned opinions on the proposal representing 18 votes.128 A further seven 
chambers engaged in political dialogue over issues other than subsidiarity.129 
This proposal also remains pending in 2017.
The Commission’s response130 again sought to distinguish between strict sub-
sidiarity concerns and those which it considered outside the scope of subsidiar-
ity: arguments relating to proportionality, to policy choices, or to other policy 
or legal issues. It considered the statement of reasons on subsidiarity sufficient 
and maintained the proposal. The case of EPPO is curious because Article 86 
TFEU already provides for unanimity, therefore enabling any Member State 
in Council to veto the proposal. Subsidiarity is, in effect, strongly politically 
protected in this context unlike where the ordinary legislative procedure is used. 
As of 4.1.2017, this proposal also remains under discussion.131
2014 marks the beginning of a sharp decline in the number of ROs.132 The 
Commission received only 21 reasoned opinions from national Parliaments 
regarding the principle of subsidiarity on a total of 15 proposals.133 The drop in 
ROs was unmatched by a correspondingly large decline in political dialogue 
but the decline has been explained by the end of the 2010–2014 Commis-
sion’s term of office.134 Only three reasoned opinions were given on the most 
controversial proposals, a Directive on the Union legal framework for customs 
infringements and sanctions135 and the proposal for a review of waste policy and 
legislation.136 The former remains pending whilst the proposal on waste policy 
126 Official Journal of the European Union, C 109, 16 April 2013, p. 9.
127 Report from the Commission 2013 final, p. 4.
128 In this case 14 votes were needed to trigger a yellow card procedure in this case.
129 Report from the Commission 2013, p. 8.
130 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the 
National Parliaments on the review of the proposal for a Council Regulation on the establish-
ment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office with regard to the principle of subsidiarity, 
in accordance with Protocol No 2, COM(2013) 851 final.
131 Procedure 2013/0255/APP, procedure available here: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/
EN/HIS/?uri=celex:52013PC0534 (Accessed 4.1.2017).
132 Report from the Commission 2014.
133 The Commission received 21 reasoned opinions, some of them relating to more than one 
document.
134 Report from the Commission 2014, p. 4 and p. 12.
135 Proposal for a Directive on the Union legal framework for customs infringements and sanc-
tions, COM(2013) 884 final.
136 Proposal for a Directive amending Directives 2008/98/EC on waste, 94/62/EC on packaging 
and packaging waste, 1999/31/EC on the landfill of waste, 2000/53/EC on end-of-life vehi-
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review was withdrawn.137 During 2014 three national parliaments proposed 
improvements to the scrutiny process138 These suggested extending the concept 
of subsidiarity to cover proportionality and legal basis issues and extending the 
scrutiny deadline from the present eight weeks, and making the withdrawal of a 
proposal compulsory where the present thresholds for a ‘yellow card’ are met.139
The trend for very few ROs continued in 2015, with only eight reasoned 
opinions on subsidiarity.140 This is matched by a significant drop also in the 
number of contributions in political dialogue as compared with 2013 and 
2014. Five, thus more than half of all reasoned opinions and representing 7 
votes, related to one single proposal concerning a solidarity mechanism for the 
relocation of the Union’s ‘Dublin’ system refugees.141 The new Juncker Com-
mission’s work program focused on a limited number of new initiatives and 
withdrawing a substantial number of pending proposals.142 The trend may also 
be linked to the Commission’s new ‘Better Regulation’ package in May 2015, 
and new consultation and feedback mechanisms intended to produce a more 
inclusive pre-legislative process.143 These are expected to refocus scrutiny from 
post-proposal examination to the pre-legislative stage.144
In 2016, the national parliaments dispelled any premature ideas about the 
death of the EWS that might arise from the low number of contributions in 
2014 and 2015.145 IPEX records 56 separate reasoned opinions, comprising 83 
votes, on 21 different legislative proposals with scrutiny dates clearly ending 
during 2016. An additional, somewhat anomalous proposal, the EP proposal 
for a Council decision to amend the EU voting rules, received a further eight 
cles, 2006/66/EC on batteries and accumulators and waste batteries and accumulators, and 
2012/19/EU on waste electrical and electronic equipment, COM(2014) 397 final.
137 OJ C/2015/80/20.
138 DK Folketing “Twenty-three recommendations to strengthen the role of national Parliaments in 
the European decision-making process”, UK House of Lords “The role of National Parliaments 
in the European Union’ and NL Tweede Kamer ‘Ahead in Europe’.
139 Report from the Commission 2014, p. 5. In detail see Jančić, 2015, 52, pp. 939–975.
140 Report from the Commission Annual Report 2015 on Subsidiarity and Proportionality Brus-
sels, 15.7.2016 COM(2016) 469 final, p. 7.
141 Proposal for a Regulation establishing a crisis relocation mechanism and amending Regula-
tion (EU) 604/2013, COM(2015) 450 final.
142 A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change – 
Political Guidelines for the next European Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/docs/
pg_en.pdf (Accessed 4.1.2017).
143 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Euro-
pean Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Better regulation 
for better results – An EU agenda Strasbourg, 19.5.2015 COM(2015) 215 final. For analysis, 
Dawson, Mark, “Better Regulation and the Future of EU Regulatory Law and Politics” Com-
mon Market Law Review 5/2016, pp. 1209–1236.
144 Report from the Commission 2015, p. 2.
145 The data used for this year are compiled form IPEX as of 4.1.2017.
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votes in six ROs146 straddling 2015 and 2016.147 The proposed Directive on the 
posting of workers148 received enough votes to become the third proposal to 
date to receive a ‘yellow card’ with 14 ROs totaling 22 votes.149 The proposal for 
recasting the Dublin regulation received 10 votes from 8 ROs.150 Sweden did 
not issue a RO for either of these, although it remained the most active national 
parliament with 9 ROs worth 18 votes.
Other proposals attracting ROs were significantly less controversial. The 
closest contenders each receiving between four and six votes. A proposed deci-
sion on an information exchange mechanism on instruments in the energy 
sector151 received six votes from four chambers152 as did a proposal on coopera-
tion between national consumer authorities.153 A proposal on tax disclosure for 
undertakings154 gathered four votes.155 So did a proposal on entry and residence 
rules for third country national skilled workers,156 and a proposal concerning 
146 European Parliament resolution PE/2015/2035 of 11 November 2015 on the reform of the 
electoral law of the European Union.
147 As the Swedish RO 2016/16:KU27 notes, the EP had not informed national parliaments of 
the proposal or the scrutiny date.
148 Directive amending Directive 96/71/EC of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting of 
workers in the framework of the provision of services, COM(2016) 505 final.
149 ROs were received from Bulgaria (National Assembly), Croatia (Croatian Parliament), Czech 
Republic (Czech Senate, Czech Chamber of Deputies), Denmark (Danish Parliament), Esto-
nia (Estonian Parliament), Hungary (Hungarian National Assembly), Latvia (Saeima Par-
liament of Latvia), Lithuania (Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania), Poland (Polish Senate, 
Polish Sejm), Romania (Romanian Senate, Romanian Chamber of Deputies), and Slovakia 
(National Council of the Slovak Republic).
150 Proposal for a Regulation establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Mem-
ber State responsibility or examining an application for international protection lodged in 
one of the Member
States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast), COM(2016) 270 final.
151 Proposal for a Decision establishing an information exchange mechanism with regard to 
intergovernmental agreements and non-binding instruments between Member States and 
third countries in the field of energy, COM(2016) 53 final.
152 Austria (only Austrian Federal Council), France (Only French Senate), Malta (Maltese House 
of Representatives), Portugal (Assembleia da Republica).
153 Proposal for a Regulation on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the 
enforcement of consumer protection laws, COM(2016) 283 final: Austria (only Austrian 
Federal Council), Bulgaria (Bulgarian National Assembly), Czech Republic (Czech Chamber 
of Deputies), Sweden (Swedish Riksdag).
154 Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of income tax 
information by certain undertakings and branches, COM(2016) 198 final.
155 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 
2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of income tax information by certain undertakings and 
branches, COM(2016) 198 final: Ireland (Irish Houses of Oireachtas), Sweden (Swedish 
Riksdag).
156 Proposal for a Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nation-
als for the purposes of highly skilled employment, COM(2016) 378 final, with ROs from 
Bulgaria (Bulgarian National Assembly), and the Czech Republic (Czech Senate and Czech 
Chamber of Deputies).
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tax avoidance in the internal market.157 A proposal on civil aviation regulation 
gathered three votes from two parliaments,158 as did a proposal on the security 
of the gas supply159 and one on establishing a European body of regulators for 
electronic communications.160 The majority of proposals which received any 
attention at all from national parliaments received only one or two Reasoned 
Opinions.161
The Commission’s response to the ‘yellow card’ on the revised posted work-
ers rules continues its ‘legal rule-following’162 policy of responding in detail 
only to arguments that fall within the strict definition of subsidiarity.163 The 
communication rebuts claims that the existing rules are sufficient and adequate, 
that the Union is not the adequate level of the action, that the proposal fails to 
explicitly recognize Member States’ competences on remuneration and condi-
tions of employment and that the justification contained in the proposal with 
regard to the subsidiarity principle is too succinct. Thus, a third consecutive 
‘yellow card’ is dismissed as not raising valid subsidiarity concerns. The curious 
case of the EU elections proposal also raises questions about the nature of sub-
sidiarity control when unusual legislative procedures are invoked in areas which 
are not obviously exclusive Union competences listed in Article 3 TFEU.
Is the EWS ineffective? This is hard to justify given the correlation between 
ROs and stalled or withdrawn proposals. From 2009 to the beginning of 2017, 
the dialogue between national parliaments and the Commission also suggests 
that how subsidiarity is defined is not decisive. It has nevertheless been argued 
that subsidiarity should also formally be deemphasized in favor of explicitly 
more detailed reviews of conferral and the substance of the legislation.164 When-
ever the Commission responds to claims which it does not accept are strict 
157 Proposal for a Directive laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect 
the functioning of the internal market, COM(2016) 26 final, from Malta (Maltese House of 
Representatives) and the Swedish Riksdag.
158 Proposal for a Regulation on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing 
a European Union Aviation Safety Agency, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 216/2008, 
COM(2015) 613 final, with ROs from Italy (only Italian Senate), Malta (Maltese House of 
Representatives).
159 Proposal for a Regulation concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply and 
repealing Regulation (EU) No 994/2010: Bulgarian National Assembly and Austrian Federal 
Council, COM(2016) 52 final.
160 Proposal for a Regulation establishing the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Com-
munications COM(2016) 591 final; Italian Senate and Maltese House of Representatives.
161 COM(2016) 113 final; COM(2016) 26 final; COM(2015) 750 final; COM(2016) 551 
final; COM(2016) 52 final; COM(2016) 491 final; COM(2016) 25 final; COM(2015) 613 
final; COM(2016) 289 final; COM(2015) 595 final; COM(2016) 590 final; COM(2016) 
591 final; COM(2016) 589 final; COM(2015) 634; COM(2015) 635 final; COM(2016) 
465 final.
162 Cooper, 2016, p. 23.
163 Communication from the Commission on the proposal for a Directive amending the Posting 
of Workers Directive, with regard to the principle of subsidiarity, COM(2016) 505 final, p. 5.
164 Davor, 2015, pp. 939–976, at 942 and 974.
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subsidiarity claims, as it has undertaken to do, this is already taking place. If 
this process is maintained the EWS will be a success in engaging national parlia-
ments to debate broader questions about the proper balance between EU level 
action and national and sub-national action even if the direct consequences of 
‘yellow cards’ are hard to observe. Although we have not conducted full review 
of correlations between reasoned opinions and legislative outcomes for 2015 
and 2016, proposals that were Reasoned Opinions appear to struggle already 
during the early stages of the process. Kiiver argued before the Lisbon treaty 
that even weak tools like the yellow card system could therefore be a catalyst for 
real and effective parliamentary action.165
Nevertheless, it remains the case that subsidiarity review by the national 
parliaments does not, directly, lead to withdrawal of proposals for reasons of 
subsidiarity. The Monti II proposal was withdrawn, according to the Commis-
sion,166 not for subsidiarity concerns but because the objections amounted to 
a blocking vote in the Council,167 whereas the European Public Prosecutor’s 
Office168 and the revisions to the Posted Workers Directive continued despite 
the objections because the Commission considered the concerns unwarrant-
ed.169 The Commissions responses to the EPPO yellow card then also addressed 
concerns which it did not consider subsidiarity concerns. In the third set of 
responses to the 2016 yellow card involving the directive on posted workers, the 
Commission also maintained its approach was consistent with a strict reading 
of the subsidiarity principle and undertook to respond to non-subsidiarity con-
cerns through the political dialogue system.170 Thus, the evidence from 2016 
rebuts any claim that the EWS is in desuetude, and suggests instead that ROs 
correlate well with the failure of a proposal. It also confirms earlier doubts about 
the direct impact of ROs: a new yellow card does not directly lead to the with-
drawal of the offending proposal on subsidiarity grounds.
5. EXPLAINING WEAK SUBSIDIARITY REVIEW
Both the case law and the practice of national parliaments cast doubts on 
the efficacy of subsidiarity as a legal principle. Some of the evidence could be 
165 Kiiver, Philip, “Treaty of Lisbon, the National Parliaments and the Principle of Subsidiarity” 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 15/2008, 77–83, pp. 83.
166 See the letter of 12 September 2012 from Barroso, then President of the Commission, to 
the EP Speaker Martin Schulz here: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-661_
en.htm (Accessed 4.1.2017).
167 Some academics agree: Fabbrini and Granat, 2013, pp. 115–143.
168 Commission Communication on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s 
Office with regard to the principle of subsidiarity COM(2013) 851 final.
169 Commission Communication on the proposal for a Directive amending the Posting of Work-
ers Directive, with regard to the principle of subsidiarity COM(2016) 505 final, pp. 5–6.
170 Communication on the Workers directive subsidiarity review, p. 9.
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explained by practical developments. Ex ante review in the EU institutions 
takes a fairly broad approach to elements that might be described as relating to 
the correct level of governance. Early interinstitutional agreements171 have since 
evolved into a much more detailed better regulation agenda,172 in which duties 
to state reasons exist regardless of whether the issue at hand is formally one of 
subsidiarity or proportionality and even if the instrument is not technically a 
legislative one.173 Existing legislation is also reviewable in the context of the 
Regulatory Fitness and Performance program (REFIT).174 In 2015 the Com-
mission adopted a ‘better regulation’ package. Under the terms of this package, 
subsidiarity and proportionality are addressed when the Commission publishes 
a roadmap towards a legislative package, again in a full impact assessment, 
and finally in the context of explanatory memoranda to published legislative 
proposals.175 The better regulation toolbox, introduced in 2015, requires the 
Commission to also assess the subsidiarity of both legislative and non-legis-
lative initiatives.176 A March 2016 Interinstitutional agreement further recalls 
the importance of i.a. subsidiarity throughout the pre-legislative and legislative 
processes.177
The Commission’s own meta-analysis shows that the subsidiarity of propos-
als is regularly improved prior to the publication of legislative proposals. This 
suggests pre-proposal stage review may account for a better quality of instru-
ments. Better and more detailed pre-legislative material also improves both 
national parliaments’ reviews and the quality of judicial review.178 Proposals are 
harder to challenge on subsidiarity grounds because those concerns have been 
flagged and corrected before the publication of the proposal.179 A significant 
proportion of draft proposals has been amended before they began the formal 
171 Interinstitutional Agreement of 25 October 1993 on the procedures for implementing the 
principle of subsidiarity, OJ C 329, 6.12.1993.
172 Report from the Commission 2015, p. 2 and Commission Staff Working Document Bet-
ter Regulation Guidelines SWD(2015) 111 Strasbourg 19.5.2015. See the ‘smart regula-
tion toolbox’ at http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/guidelines/docs/br_toolbox_en.pdf 
(Accessed 4.1.2017)
173 Report from the Commission 2015, pp. 2–3.
174 The Regulatory Fitness and Performance (REFIT) website is at: http://ec.europa.eu/
smart-regulation/refit/refit-platform/index_en.htm (Accessed 4.1.2017).
175 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Euro-
pean Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Better regulation 
for better results – An EU agenda, Strasbourg, 19.5.2015 COM(2015) 215 final, p. 5.
176 European Commission, “Better Regulation ‘Toolbox’” p. 22, available here: http://ec.europa.
eu/smart-regulation/guidelines/docs/br_toolbox_en.pdf (Accessed 4.1.2017).
177 Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council of the Euro-
pean Union and the European Commission on Better Law-Making OJ L 123, 12.5.2016, 
p. 1–14), Recitals 3 and 4, and articles 2, 12 and 15.
178 Wetter, Anna, “Subsidiaritetskontroll i nationella parlament och EU-domstolens ansvar för 
att kontrollen fungerar” SIEPS EPA 8/2014.
179 For some examples, see the Report from the Commission 2013, p. 3.
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legislative process.180 This trend continued throughout the survey period, and in 
2010–2015 a third or more of proposals receive subsidiarity or proportionality 
review comments from the Impact Assessment Board before being formally 
published.181 Overall the proportion of subsidiarity-related revisions at pre-leg-
islative stage, remains fairly stable. In 2009 the Impact Assessment Board (IAB) 
made recommendations on subsidiarity and proportionality in 27 out of 79 
impact assessments (34 %).182 For 2010 the figure is one half.183 In 2011, a third 
of impact assessment board opinions raised subsidiarity issues. Several specific 
examples of their effects on redrafting proposals prior to their presentation are 
given in the Commission’s review for that year.184 In 2012, the 97 impact assess-
ments led to 144 opinions of the IAB; Comments on issues of subsidiarity were 
included in 33 % of its opinions.185 The proposed Directive on Collective Cop-
yright Management led the IAB to receive a stronger assessment on the need 
for, the timing and added value of EU action under the proposed single market 
and cultural diversity legal basis.186 In a similar scenario involving the proposal 
for a regulation on a European Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps,187 the IAB 
requested and received clearer statements on the necessity and added value of 
EU action.188 2013 continued much as 2012: the IAB issued 142 opinions 
based on 97 impact assessments. Subsidiarity and proportionality issues were 
reviewed in more than a third (34 %) of the cases it examined.189 For 2014, 25 
impact assessments led to 8 improvements as regards subsidiarity or proportion-
ality, or both.190 In the final year for data, 2015, seven of 30 impact assessments 
were amended on subsidiarity or proportionality grounds.191
In addition to better processes, subsidiarity review may be deflected by alter-
natives not formally recognized as subsidiarity review. Subsidiarity is only one 
method of determining the correct level at which to act in the EU context. In 
the context of Article 5 TEU alone, subsidiarity complemented by two related 
tests: the question of whether competence has been conferred, EU law the issue 
of legal basis, and the proportionality of action under Article 5(4) TEU. This is 
180 See the Report from the Commission 2009, p. 4.
181 The Commission’s meta-analysis does not in this respect distinguish between the two.
182 See the Commission’s 2009 report, p. 4.
183 See the Commission’s 2010 report, p. 3.
184 Proposal for a Directive of 26 February 2014 on the collective management of copyright and 
related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online use in the 
internal market, COM(2012) 372 final.
185 See the Commission’s 2012 report, p. 3.
186 Proposal for a Directive 2014/26/EU of 26 February 2014 on the collective management 
of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works for 
online use in the internal market, COM(2012) 372 final.
187 Report from the Commission 2011, p. 3.
188 Ibid, p. 3.
189 Report from the Commission 2013, p. 2.
190 Report from the Commission 2014, p. 3.
191 Report from the Commission 2015, p. 5.
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also the cases in many of the leading cases on subsidiarity, where the claims are 
linked to the choice of a public health or an internal market legal basis.192 There 
are also other competing functions that have come to replace national vetoes. 
At one point, the national constitutional identity provision in Article 4(2) TEU 
was heralded as an exception to primacy193 before skepticism prevailed in com-
mentaries of the national identity case law.194 We might see the threat of the 
‘emergency brake’ mechanism in certain areas of the AFSJ and social security as 
another, perhaps more effective way of ensuring that matters remain regulated 
at the national rather than EU level195 even if unanimity requirements do not 
directly guarantee states a veto in the context of the enhanced cooperation 
procedure.196 However, the response to the EPPO proposal shows parliaments 
are interested in subsidiarity even where the Member State has a veto. National 
identity was not often invoked by the Court of Justice until the entry into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty consolidated it in the new 4(2) TEU.197 Shortly thereafter 
such arguments were regularly addressed before the Court of Justice.198 The 
choice of EU measures for legislative acts can also be framed in terms of sub-
sidiarity – does the Union seek unification through regulations or a less strict 
form of approximation through directives.199 Prohibitions of harmonization in 
the context of supporting competences could also be seen as an application of 
subsidiarity.200 Even Article 1 TEU, with its references to ‘ever closer union’, 
speaks of the need to take decisions ‘as openly as possible and as closely as 
192 See recently e.g. Poland v Parliament and Council at 105–108.
193 von Bogdandy, Armin, Schill, Stephan, “Overcoming absolute primacy: Respect for national 
identity under the Lisbon Treaty” Common Market Law Review 5/2011, pp. 1417–1453, pp. 
1417–1453. Recently in depth, Cloots, Eike, National Identity in EU Law (Oxford Univer-
sity Press 2015).
194 deBoer, Nik, “Addressing rights divergences under the Charter: Melloni” Common Market Law 
Review 4/2013, pp. 1097–1100, citing C-399/11 Melloni ECLI:EU:C:2013:107, C-208/09 
Sayn-Wittgenstein ECLI:EU:C:2010:806 and C-213/07 Michaniki ECLI:EU:C:2008:731.
195 Emergency brake articles: 83(3) TFEU, 81(3) TFEU, Article 48 TFEU.
196 Judgment in Joined Cases C-274/11 and C–295/11 Spain and Italy v Council 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:240.
197 Besselink, L.F.M., “National and Constitutional Identity before and after Lisbon” Utrecht 
Law Review. 3/2010, 36–49 at 41; van der Schyffl, Gerhard, “The constitutional relationship 
between the European Union and its member States: the role of national identity in article 
4(2) TEU” European Law Review 5/2012, 563–583 at 565; Gustavero, Barbara, “Beyond the 
Exceptionalism of Constitutional Conflicts: The Ordinary Functions of the Identity Clause” 
Yearbook of European Law 1/2012, 263–318.
198 E.g. Joined Cases Joined cases C-58/13 and C-59/13 Angelo Alberto Torresi and Pierfranc-
esco Torresi v Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati di Macerata ECLI:EU:C:2014:2088 at 
54–59; Case C–202/11 Anton Las v PSA Antwerp NV ECLI:EU:C:2013:239 at 26–27; Case 
C-391/09 Malgožata Runevič-Vardyn and Łukasz Paweł Wardyn v Vilniaus miesto savivaldybės 
administracija and Others ECLI:EU:C:2011:291 at 86–87.
199 Article 6, Protocol on subsidiarity and proportionality annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty.
200 Geiger, Rudolf, et al, (eds.) European Union Treaties (Hart, 2015), p. 37.
Licensed to helyli1 <hulib-journals@helsinki.fi>
Samuli Miettinen & Joonas Tervo
40
possible to the citizen’.201 Subsidiarity is everywhere in principle, but perhaps 
nowhere in practice.
6. CONCLUSIONS
We set out to consider how subsidiarity has been invoked since the entry 
into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in cases brought to the Court of Justice of 
the European Union and in the context of the Early Warning System used 
by national parliaments. At the end of 2016 it remains the case no judgment 
annuls EU legislation expressly because it breaches the principle. The EWS has 
also failed to produce a clear withdrawal of a proposal for subsidiarity reasons. 
Nevertheless, both types of subsidiarity review seem to be developing into more 
robust processes. In judicial review, recent case law admits extrinsic evidence 
and arguably considers the merits of subsidiarity claims in detail. This would 
surprise some early commentators and marks a departure from the main trend. 
Generally, the Court dismisses various types of subsidiarity claims either in 
context or more categorically as arguments that will never be entertained. This 
is not necessarily an indictment of subsidiarity itself, but should perhaps be seen 
in the context of annulment actions generally brought against legislative acts. 
Member States are as a rule unsuccessful regardless of the nature or quality of 
their pleas, and subsidiarity is no exception. The trend towards reviewing more, 
and better, evidence is also palpable. As pre-legislative processes produce more 
information and the Court signals a willingness to review contradictory but 
extrinsic evidence, even a process-based review will generate judgments with 
more intensity regardless of how subsidiarity is defined. In cases brought to the 
Court of Justice, there is no compelling reason to conflate issues of subsidiarity 
in the strict sense with proportionality, legal basis, or other issues related to the 
distribution of legislative powers. These are all capable of being raised in their 
own right before the Court of Justice. We are therefore cautiously optimistic 
about the outlook, if not the present achievements, of subsidiarity review before 
the Court of Justice. As for the Early Warning System, after a quiet few years 
in 2014 and 2015, 2016 marks a return to a high number of reasoned opin-
ions and involves a third ‘yellow card’. Here, subsidiarity is defined strictly by 
the Commission. This also impacts on the policies of national parliaments in 
how they engage with the process. If all national parliaments were as active as 
Sweden, the procedure and perhaps its outcome might look very different. The 
effectiveness of the early warning system might be criticized because the yellow 
cards to date have not resulted in the withdrawal of proposals due to subsidiar-
ity concerns. However, the evidence shows that proposals with relatively large 
201 TEU art. 1.
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numbers of reasoned opinions either die on the operating table that is the EU 
legislative process or, in exceptional cases, are later revived as shadows of their 
former selves. The Protocol 2 system is on balance a success for national parlia-
ments because despite the strict definition of proportionality, they are able to 
raise their concerns and, arguably, the correlation between ROs and failed or 
stalled proposals suggests this is effective. In an era where lawyers increasingly 
recognize the value of soft power, it would be interesting to trace the effects of 
these arguments through the legislative process. A detailed examination may 
suggest ROs with non-subsidiarity claims translate into particular outcomes not 
only for entire legislative proposals but for the parts which national parliaments 
considered especially controversial.
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